नाथ योनिसहस्रेषु येषु येषु व्रजाम्यहम् ।
तेषु तेष्वच्युता भक्तिरच्युतेऽस्तु सदा त्वयि ॥
या प्रीतिरविवेकानां विषयेष्वनपायिनी ।
त्वामनुस्मरतः सा मे हृदयान्नापसर्पतु ॥

nātha yoni-sahasreṣu yeṣu yeṣu vrajāmy aham |
teṣu teṣv acyutā bhaktir acyute’stu sadā tvayi ||
yā prītir avivekānāṁ viṣayeṣv anapāyinī |
tvām anusmarataḥ sā me hṛdayān nāpasarpatu ||
(Viṣṇu Purāṇa: 1.20.18–19; cited in Hari-bhakti-vilāsa: 8.434–435; Kṛṣṇa Sandarbha: 142; Bhakti Sandarbha: 217; Prīti Sandarbha: 50, 61)

“O Nātha, wherever I go in the course of thousands of births, may I always have unwavering (acyutā) bhakti to you, the unwavering Lord (Acyuta)! As I continuously remember you, may that everlasting prīti which [is possessed of a characteristic like the prīti which] the undiscerning have for objects of the senses, never slip away from my heart.”

Commentary

atha tasyāḥ svarūpa-lakṣaṇaṁ śrī-viṣṇu-purāṇe prahlādenātideśa-dvārā darśitam—yā prītir avivekānāṁ … iti | yā yal-lakṣaṇā sā tal-lakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ | na tu yā saiveti vakṣyamāṇa-lakṣaṇaikyāt | tathāpi pūrvasyā māyā-śakti-vṛttimayatvena, uttarasyāḥ svarūpa-śakti-mayatvena bhedāt, prīti-śabdena khalu mut-pramoda-harsānandādi-paryāyaṁ sukham ucyate | bhāva-hārda-sauhṛdādi-paryāyā priyatā cocyate | tatra ullāsātmako jñāna-viśeṣaḥ sukham | tathā viṣayānukūlyātmakas tad-ānukūlyānugata-tat-spṛhā-tad-anubhava-hetukollāsamaya-jñāna-viśeṣaḥ priyatā | ata evāsyāṁ sukhatve’pi pūrvato vaiśiṣṭyam | tayoḥ pratiyogiṇau ca krameṇa duḥkha-dveṣau | ataḥ sukhasya ullāsa-mātrātmakatvād āśraya eva vidyate, na tu viṣayaḥ, evaṁ tat-pratiyogino duḥkhasya ca | priyatāyās tv ānukūlya-spṛhātmakatvād viṣayaś ca vidyate, evaṁ prātikūlyātmakasya tat-pratiyogino dveṣasya ca | tatra sukha-duḥkhayor āśrayau suṣṭhu-duṣṭa-karmāṇau jīvau | priyatā-dveṣayor āśrayau prīyamāṇa-dviṣantau, viṣayau ca tat-priya-dveṣyau | tatra prīty-arthānāṁ kriyāṇāṁ viṣayasyādhikaraṇatvam eva dīpty-arthavat, dveṣārthānāṁ tu viṣayasya karmatvaṁ hanty arthavat | etad uktaṁ bhavati—kartur īpsitatamaṁ khalu karma | īpsitatamatvaṁ ca yā kriyārabhyate, sākṣāt tayaiva sādhayitum iṣṭatamatvam | sādhanaṁ cotpādyatvena, vikāryatvena, saṁskāryatvena, prāpyatvena ca sampādanam iti catur-vidham | tasmād antar-bhūta-ṇy-artho yo dhātuḥ, sa eva sa-karmakaḥ syāt, nānyaḥ | yathā ghaṭaṁ karotīty ukte ghaṭe utpadyate tam utpādayatīti gamyate | taṇḍulaṁ pacatīti taṇḍulo viklidyati taṁ vikledayatīty ādi | sattā-dīpty-ādīnāṁ tu na tādṛśatvaṁ gamyata ity akarmakatvam eveti | na ca prīter jñāna-rūpatvena sakarmakatvam āśaṅkyam | cetati-prabhṛtīnāṁ tad-vinābhāva-darśanāt | ato brahma-jñānavad bhūta-rūpo’yam artho, na ca yajñādi-jñānavad bhavya-rūpo vidhi-sāpekṣa iti siddham | tad evaṁ prīti-śabdasya sukha-paryāyatve priyatā-paryāyatve ca sthite yā prītir avivekānām ity atra tūttaratratvam eva spaṣṭam, na pūrvatvam | pūrvatve sati viṣayeṣv anubhūyamāneṣu yā prītiḥ sukham ity arthaḥ, uttaratve tu viṣayeṣu yā prītiḥ priyatety arthaḥ | tataś cānubhūyamāneṣv ity adhyāhāra-kalpanayā kliṣṭā pratipattir iti | tad evaṁ putrādi-viṣayaka-prītes tad-ānukūlyādy-ātmakatvena bhagavat-prīter api tathābhūtatvena samāna-lakṣaṇatvam eva | tatra pūrvasyā māyā-śakti-vṛttimayatvam ‘icchā dveṣaḥ sukhaṁ duḥkham’ ity-ādinā śrī-gītopaniṣad-ādau vyaktam asti | uttarasyās tu svarūpa-śakti-vṛttimayatvam antike darśayiṣyāmaḥ | tasmāt sādhu vyākhyātaṁ yā yal-lakṣaṇā sā tal-lakṣaṇā iti | iyam eva bhagavat-prītir bhakti-śabdenāpy ucyate parameśvara-niṣṭhatvāt pitrādi-guru-viṣayaka-prītivat | ata eva tad-avyavahita-pūrva-padye bhakti-śabdenaivopādāya prārthitāsau—‘nātha yoni-sahasreṣu’ ity ādau | atra yā prārthitā, saiva hi svarūpa-nirdeśa-pūrvakam uttara-ślokena yā prītir ity ādinā vivicya prārthitā | ata eva na paunaruktyam api | ato dvayor aikyād eva śrīmat-parameśvareṇāpy anugṛhṇatā tayor ekayoktyaivānubhāṣitam—‘bhaktir mayi tavāsty eva bhūyo’py evaṁ bhaviṣyati’ iti | tayor bhede tu tadvat prītir apy anubhāṣyeta | … tad evaṁ viṣaya-prīti-dṛṣṭāntena śrī-bhagavad-viṣayānukūlyātmakas tad-anugata-spṛhādi-mayo jñāna-viśeṣas tat-prītir iti lakṣitam |
(Excerpted from Prīti Sandarbha: 61)

“Now, its [i.e., prīti’s] inherent characteristic (svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) is shown by Prahlāda in Śrī Viṣṇu Purāṇa by means of analogical extension (atideśa): yā prītir avivekānāṁ … [i.e., this verse is cited]. ‘Which’ () and ‘that’ () mean ‘of which characteristic’ (yal-lakṣaṇā) and ‘of that characteristic’ (tal-lakṣaṇā), and not, rather, [simply] ‘which’ and ‘exactly that,’ because of a oneness [between Bhagavat-prīti, i.e., prīti for Bhagavān, and viṣaya-prīti, i.e., prīti for sāṁsāric objects] on the basis of a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) [which is] to be discussed ahead [i.e., it is not that Prahlāda prays to have for Bhagavān the same prīti that the undiscerning have for objects in saṁsāra, but rather that Prahlāda prays to have Bhagavat-prīti, which is distinct in nature from viṣaya-prīti yet also possesses a characteristic that will be explained ahead, viz., being constituted of favorability (ānukūlya) towards its object, that viṣaya-prīti also possesses]. Still, because of a [simultaneously also co-existent] distinction [between these two types of prīti] on account of the former’s being constituted of a function (vṛtti) of the māyā-śakti, and the later’s being constituted of the svarūpa-śakti, this [i.e., the following explanation] is stated: certainly by the word prīti, (1) happiness (sukha), synonyms for which are joy (mut), jubilation (pramoda), delight (harṣa), bliss (ānanda), and so forth, is referred to, and (2) fondness (priyatā), synonyms for which are love (bhāva), tenderness (hārda), affection (sauhṛda), and so forth, is [also] referred to. In this regard, sukha (happiness) is a particular form of awareness (jñāna) constituted of elation (ullāsa), and priyatā (fondness) is a particular form of awareness (jñāna) constituted of favorability (ānukūlya) towards its object and filled with elation caused by experience of that [object] as a result of desire for that [object] arising from favorability (ānukūlya) towards that [object]. Therefore, although the quality of sukha (happiness) is present in this [i.e., in priyatā], there is a distinction [in priyatā] from the former [i.e., from sukha]. The opposites of these two [i.e., sukha and priyatā] are, respectively, misery (duḥkha) and hatred (dveṣa). Therefore, because of sukha’s being constituted of elation alone, it has only a subject (āśraya) [i.e., a locus where it dwells], and no object. Such is so also of misery, its opposite. Because of priyatā’s being constituted of a desire for favorability (ānukūlya) [towards its object], however, it also has an object [i.e., a person to whom it is directed, in addition to a subject]. Such is so also of hatred, its opposite. In this regard, the subjects (āśrayas) of sukha (happiness) and duḥkha (misery) are jīvas possessed of good and bad karma [respectively]. The subjects (āśrayas) of priyatā (fondness) and hatred (dveṣa) are those engaging in pleasing [another] and hating [another, respectively], and the objects (viṣayas) [of priyatā (fondness) and hatred (dveṣa)] are those who are dear (priya) or hateable (dveṣya) to them [i.e., those subjects, respectively].

“In this regard, the object (viṣaya) of verbs the meaning of which is prīti [i.e., to please, alt., to love], like those the meaning of which is dīpti [i.e., to shine], have locativeness (adhikaraṇatvam) [i.e., they take the locative case], whereas the object (viṣaya) of verbs the meaning of which is dveṣa [i.e., to hate], like those the meaning of which is hanti [i.e., to kill], have accusativeness (karmatva) [i.e., they take the accusative case].

“[In regard to the subject-matter under discussion,] This is said: ‘The direct object (karma) [of a verb (kriyā)] is that which is most desired by the agent (kartā)’ (Pāṇini: 1.4.49). Being ‘most desired’ (īpsitatamam), furthermore, means being desired most to be accomplished directly by that action in particular which is being undertaken. The accomplishing (sādhana) [of an action], furthermore, means effecting [it] by means of it (1) having been produced, (2) having been transformed, (3) having been improved, or (4) having been attained. Thus, it is of four types. Therefore, only a verbal root (dhātu) in which ṇi [i.e., the affix ṇi, which is what gives a verb a causative sense] is contained shall be transitive (sakarmaka), and not any other. For example, in the case of the statement, ‘He makes a pot,’ when a pot is produced, ‘He produces that [i.e., the pot]’ is understood. In [the statement], ‘He cooks rice,’ [it is understood that] rice softens, and he softens it, and so on [i.e., instances of verbs meaning improvement and attainment are to be understood in the same way]. Existing, shining, and so forth [i.e., the verbal roots that mean to exist, to shine, etc.], however, are understood to not be such [i.e., to not be transitive (sakarmaka)], and thus have instransitiveness (akarmakatva) [i.e., they are intransitive verbs]. Furthermore, transitiveness (sakarmakatva) of prīti [i.e., verbs meaning prīti being transitive] is not to be suspected on account of being a form of awareness (jñāna) because of observance of the existence of those [verbal roots (dhātus)] that signify consciousness (cit) and the like separate from that [i.e., separate from transitiveness (sakarmakatva); in other words, verbs meaning prīti should not be suspected to be transitive on account of their being a form of awareness (jñāna) because dhātus for acts of consciousness, such as √cit and √prī, are considered to be intransitive (akarmaka)].

“Therefore, it is established that this attainment (artha) [viz., prīti in the sense of priyatā, defined as a particular form of awareness constituted of favorability towards its object and filled with elation caused by experience of that object as a result of desire for that object arising from favorability towards that object] is a prior existent (bhūta-rūpa) like awareness of Brahman (Brahma-jñāna), and is not something to be brought into existence (bhavya-rūpa) [i.e., that needs to be produced] like knowledge of yajña or other matters dependent upon injunctions [i.e., unlike knowledge of practices enjoined in śāstra such as yajña, which has to be created by study, prīti as well as Brahma-jñāna are self-existent eternal realities constituted of Bhagavān’s svarūpa-śakti that are not created but rather become manifest to a recipient, and unlike yajña and other forms of karma that have the potency to grant their performer an attainment, such as Svarga, only because of their being enjoined in the śāstra and not because of any potency inherent in them to do so, prīti, being a function of Bhagavān’s svarūpa-śakti is endowed with inherent potency to grant attainments to a recipient of itself].

“Thus, in this way, with the establishment of the word prīti being a synonym for [both] sukha (happiness) and priyatā (fondness), here in yā prīti avivekānām [i.e., in the prayer of Prahlāda in VP 1.20.19], [the word prīti‘s] being only in the latter [sense], and not being the former, is clear. When it is [interpreted] in the former [sense], the meaning is ‘prīti, that is, sukha (happiness), which is being experienced in objects (viṣayas),’ whereas when it is [interpreted] in the latter [sense], the meaning is, ‘prīti, that is, priyatā (fondness), for objects (viṣayas),’ and thus also, [if prīti is interpreted to mean sukha,] there is a forced conclusion by means of supplying the ellipsis (adhyāhāra) ‘being experienced’ (anubhūyamāneṣu) [as a qualifier of the objects (viṣayas) of prīti, i.e., if prīti is interpreted to mean sukha, then one has to also make the far-fetched interpretation that the ‘objects’ (viṣayeṣu) mentioned in the verse are those that are being experienced, whereas when prīti is interpreted to mean priyatā, there is no need to supply any ellipsis and the statement conveys a clear and valuable sense just as it is].

“Thus, in this way, because of prīti the object of which is a son or otherwise being constituted of favorability towards that [object], and because of prīti for Bhagavān too being of such nature [i.e., because of Bhagavat-prīti too being constituted of favorability towards its object, viz., Bhagavān], there is a certainly a likeness in characteristic [shared by viṣaya-prīti and Bhagavat-prīti]. Therein, the former’s being constituted of a function (vṛtti) of the māyā-śakti is stated in Śrī Gītopaniṣad (13.6): ‘Desire, aversion, happiness, suffering, the aggregate [i.e., the body], consciousness, and resolution—this in sum is said to be the field (kṣetra) [of a jīva in saṁsāra’s experience] along with its transformations’ [i.e., viṣaya-prīti is referred to by the word ‘desire’ (icchā) in BG 13.6]. The latter’s [i.e., Bhagavat-prīti’s], on the contrary, being constituted of a function (vṛtti) of the svarūpa-śakti will be shown ahead shortly [in PRS 65]. Therefore, it was rightly explained [earlier in regard to the correlative pronouns ‘which’ () and ‘that’ () in VP 1.20.19] that ‘which’ () and ‘that’ () mean ‘of which characteristic’ (yal-lakṣaṇā) and ‘of that characteristic’ (tal-lakṣaṇā) [i.e., it was rightly explained that the analogy in VP 1.20.19 between Bhagavat-prīti and viṣaya-prīti is an analogy based not on a constitutional or complete equivalence between these two types of prīti but rather on a likeness between them on account of a particular characteristic shared by them, viz., favorability towards their object].
“This prīti for Bhagavān, like prīti the object of which is an elder such as one’s father, is referred to by the word bhakti as well because of [its] being [a form of] fixity (niṣṭhā) upon Parameśvara. Therefore, in nātha yoni-sahasreṣu … [i.e., in VP 1.20.18], the verse immediately prior to this [i.e., prior to the verse under discussion, viz., yā prītir avivekānāṁ …], that [i.e., Bhagavat-prīti] is prayed for by means of the word bhakti. What is prayed for here [i.e., in VP 1.20.18, using the word bhakti]—exactly that is specified by designating its nature (svarūpa) and prayed for in yā prītir … [i.e., VP 1.20.19, using the word prīti]. Therefore, there is no redundancy either. Thus, because of the definite oneness [in meaning] of the two [i.e., of the two words bhakti and prīti in the context of their usage here in VP 1.20.18–19], there is a restatement of the two by mention of one [of them, viz., bhakti] even by Śrīmat Parameśvara as he bestows favor [upon Prahlāda in the following verse, VP 1.20.20], ‘You certainly have bhakti for me, and this will become even more abundant [in the future].’ If there were a distinction between the two [i.e., between the meaning of bhakti and prīti in the context of their usage here in VP 1.20.18–19], however, Bhagavān would have mentioned prīti as well like that [i.e., as he did bhakti when he answered Prahlāda’s prayer]. …

“Thus, in this way, by means of the example of viṣaya-prīti [i.e., prīti for objects of the senses], prīti for him [i.e., Bhagavān] is defined as a particular form of awareness (jñāna) constituted of favorability (ānukūlya) towards its object and filled with desire for that [object] arising from favorability (ānukūlya) towards that [object] and so forth [i.e., as was stated earlier in regarding to meaning of priyatā (fondness); thus, the full definition of Bhagavat-prīti is a particular form of awareness (jñāna) constituted of favorability (ānukūlya) towards its object, viz., Śrī Bhagavān, and filled with elation caused by experience of Śrī Bhagavān as a result of desire for Śrī Bhagavān arising from favorability (ānukūlya) towards Śrī Bhagavān]. Like experience (anubhava) of the sweetness (mādhurya) of objects of the senses (viṣaya), however, experience of the sweetness of Bhagavān is different from that [i.e., from Bhagavat-prīti, meaning, experience of Bhagavān’s mādhurya is another state of awareness (jñāna) that comes about as a result of Bhagavat-prīti].”

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