सुखं तु जगतामेव काम्यं धर्मेण जायते ।
अधर्मजन्यं दुःखं स्यात्प्रतिकूलं सचेतसाम् ॥
निर्दुःखत्वे सुखे चेच्छा तज्ज्ञानादेव जायते ।
इच्छा तु तदुपाये स्यादिष्टोपायत्वधीर्यदि ॥
sukhaṁ tu jagatām eva kāmyaṁ dharmeṇa jāyate |
adharma-janyaṁ duḥkhaṁ syāt pratikūlaṁ sacetasām ||
nirduḥkhatve sukhe cecchā taj-jñānād eva jāyate |
icchā tu tad-upāye syād iṣṭopāyatva-dhīr yadi ||
(Bhāṣa-pariccheda: 145–146)
“Pleasure (sukha), that which is the entire world’s object of desire, arises by means of merit (dharma). Pain (duḥkha), which is produced by demerit (adharma), shall be [defined as] that which is unpleasant (pratikūla) for all conscious beings. Desire for painlessness and pleasure arises specifically from knowledge of these, whereas desire shall come about for a means to these [i.e., to painlessness and pleasure] if there is awareness of [something’s] instrumentality to that which is desired [viz., painlessness and pleasure].”
Commentary
sukhaṁ nirūpayati—sukham tv iti | kāmyam abhilāṣa-viṣayaḥ | dharmeṇeti dharmatvena sukhatvena kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva ity arthaḥ | duḥkhaṁ nirūpayati—adharmeti | adharmatvena duḥkhatvena kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva ity arthaḥ | pratikūlameti duḥkhatva-jñānād eva sarveṣāṁ svābhāvika-dveṣa-viṣaya ity arthaḥ | icchāṁ nirūpayati—niḥduḥkhatva iti | icchā dvividhā phala-viṣayiṇī upāya-viṣayiṇī ca, phalaṁ tu sukhaṁ duḥkhābhāvaś ca | tatra phalecchāṁ prati phala-jñānaṁ kāraṇam | ata eva puruṣārthaḥ sambhavati ‘yad jñātaṁ sat sva-vṛttitayeṣyate sa puruṣārthaḥ’ iti tal-lakṣaṇāt | itarecchānadhīnecchā-viṣayatvaṁ phalito’rthaḥ | upāyecchāṁ pratīṣṭa-sādhanatā-jñānaṁ kāraṇam |
(Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī: 145–146)
“He delineates pleasure (sukham): sukham tu … [i.e., the author writes verse 145]. [The word] Kāmyam means object of desire. Regarding ‘by means of merit’ (dharmeṇa), the meaning is that there is a cause and effect relation between meritoriousness and pleasurability [i.e., merit (dharma) is the cause of experiencing pleasure (sukha)]. He delineates pain (duḥkham): adharma … [i.e., the author writes the second half of verse 145]. The meaning is that there is a cause and effect relation between demeritoriousness and painfulness [i.e., demerit (adharma) is the cause of experiencing pain (duḥkha)]. Regarding ‘that which is unpleasant’ (pratikūlam), the meaning is an object of natural aversion (dveṣa) for all specifically because of [everyone’s] knowledge of [that object’s] painfulness [i.e., of its being a cause of pain]. He delineates desire (icchā): niḥdukhatve … [i.e., the author writes verse 146]. Desire (icchā) is of two types: that the object of which is the goal and that the object of which is a means to the goal]. The goal specifically is pleasure (sukham) and the absence of pain (duḥkhāvbhāva). In this regard, knowledge of the goal is the cause in regard to desire for the goal. Thus, it [i.e., the goal—pleasure (sukham) and the absence of pain (duḥkhāvbhāva)] can be the aim of an embodied being (puruṣārtha) on account of the definition [of a puruṣārtha], ‘That which upon being known will be desired as being one’s own state of being is the aim of an embodied being (puruṣārtha).’ ‘The objectivity [i.e., that which exists as the object] of the desire that is non-dependent on another desire [i.e., the fundamental, ultimate, and unconditional object of desire for the sake of attaining which all other objects of desire are means]’ is the consequent meaning. Knowledge of [an object’s] being a means to attainment of the desired object [i.e., the puruṣārtha as afore defined] is the cause in regard to desire for a means.”