लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ।
lokavat tu līlā-kaivalyam |
(Vedānta-sūtra: 2.1.33)
“Like a person’s [endeavor to act], it [i.e., Brahman’s endeavor of emanating the universe], rather, is a singularity of play.”
Commentary
sṛṣṭau brahmaṇaḥ pravṛttir upayuktā na veti viṣaye pūrva-pakṣam āha—
naprayojanavatvāt |
pūrvato nety anuvartate | niṣedhārthakena na-śabdena samāsāt nātra na lopaḥ | pravṛttir nopayujyate | kutaḥ? tasya pūrṇasya prayojanābhāvāt | svārthā parārthā ca pravṛttir loke dṛṣṭā | tatra nādyā sambhavati pūrṇa-kāmatva-śruti-virodhāt | nāpy antyā samartho hi parānugrahāya pravartate na tu janma-maraṇādi-vividha-yātanā-samarpaṇāya | ṛte prayojanāt pravṛttau tv aprekṣā-kāritāpattis tataḥ sarvajña-śruti-vyākopaḥ | tasmān nopayuktā pravṛttir iti |
evaṁ prāpte samādhatte—
lokavat tu līlā-kaivalyam |
śaṅkā-cchedāya tu-śabdaḥ | paripūrṇasyāpi vicitra-sṛṣṭau pravṛttir līlaiva kevalā na tu sva-phalānusandhi-pūrvikā | atra dṛṣṭānto loketi | ṣaṣṭhy-antāt vatiḥ | lokasya sukhonmattasya yathā sukhodrekāt phala-nirapekṣā nṛtyādi-līlā dṛśyate tatheśvarasya | tasmāt svarūpānanda-svābhāviky eva līlā ‘devasyaiva svabhāvo’yam āpta-kāmasya kā spṛhā’ iti maṇḍūkya-śruteḥ | ‘sṛṣṭy-ādikaṁ harir naiva prayojanam apekṣya tu | kurute kevalānandād yathā mattasya nartanam ||’ pūrṇānandasya tasyeha prayojana-matiḥ kutaḥ | muktā apy āpta-kāmāḥ syuḥ kim u tasyākhilātmanaḥ || iti smaraṇāc ca | na cātra dṛṣṭāntenāsārvajñyaṁ prasaktam, vinā phalānusandhim ānandodrekeṇa līlāyata ity etāvat svīkārāt | ucchvāsa-praśvāsa-dṛṣṭānte’pi suṣupty-ādau tad-āpatteḥ | rāja-dṛṣṭāntas tu tat-tat-krīḍā-sambhūtasya sukhasya phalatvān nopāttaḥ |
(Govinda-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra: 2.1.32–33)
“[A question is raised:] Is [the notion of] Brahman’s endeavor (pravṛtti) in regard to emanation [of the universe] fitting or not? The author states a prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa) on this subject [in Vedānta-sūtra 2.1.32]:
“‘[No, it is not fitting that Brahman would make an endeavor to emanate the universe] Because of [Brahman’s] not being possessed of a motive (naprayojanavattvāt).’
“The ‘no’ [stated in this prima facie view (pūrvapakṣa)] follows from the previous [sūtra, i.e., it is supplied in the reading of this present sūtra even though it is not literally stated in the sūtra]. Because of the compound [of the word “because of being possessed of a motive” (prayojanavatvāt)] with the word na signifying negation [in the compound naprayojanavatvāt], the word na is not omitted here [i.e., in this sūtra, the na written in the sūtra is in compound with the word prayojanavatvāt; it is not a separate word, and the aforementioned ‘no’ understood to be intended in the sūtra is supplied from the previous sūtra]. The endeavor (pravrtti) [to emanate the universe] is not fitting [for Brahman]. Why? Because of the non-existence of a motive for he who is [by nature] fulfilled (pūrṇa). An endeavor is seen in the world to be for the sake of oneself (svārthā) or for the sake of another (parārthā). In this case, the former [type of endeavor, i.e., Brahman supposedly making an endeavor for the sake of himself] is not possible because of [the occurrence in that case of] a contradiction of the śruti [i.e., statements heard in the Śruti-śāstra] of [his] being of fulfilled desire [i.e., one only makes an endeavor to perform an action for oneself when one has an unfulfilled desire; since Brahman has no unfulfilled desires, he makes no endeavor to act for himself and thus he would not make any endeavor to emanate the universe for this reason]. Nor is the latter [type of endeavor, i.e., Brahman supposedly making an endeavor for the sake of another possible] since one who is capable acts for the sake of favoring others, and not, rather, for the sake of consigning various miseries [to others], such as birth and death [i.e., miseries, such as birth and death, are certainly suffered by all living beings through the emanation, and a beneficent Īśvara who is capable of favoring others would never emanate a universe that causes such miseries for the living beings inside that universe and thus Brahman would not make any endeavor to emanate the universe for the sake of another; given that an endeavor is either for oneself or for another and that Brahman makes neither such endeavor, it can be concluded that Brahman makes an endeavor to emanate the universe]. If the endeavor [on the part of Brahman to emanate the universe] is without a motive (prayojana), however [i.e., if Brahman is still considered to emanate the universe despite not making an endeavor to perform such an act], the fault of causing an action [to be performed] without insight [into the effects upon others produced by the action] would occur [on the part of Brahman, since the emanation of the universe evidently results in the suffering of the living beings within it], and then contradiction of the śruti [i.e., statements heard in the Śruti-śāstra] of [Brahman’s being] omniscient [would occur since it would imply he was unaware that his acts of emanating the universe and so forth would result in the suffering of living beings within the universe]. Therefore, an endeavor [on the part of Brahman to emanate the universe] is not fitting.’
“When this [prima facie view] is encountered, the author answers [i.e., resolves this doubt, as follows in Vedānta-sūtra 2.1.32]:
“‘Like a person’s (lokavat) [endeavor], it [i.e., Brahman’s endeavor to emanate the universe], rather, is a singularity of play (līlā-kaivalyam).’
“The word ‘rather’ (tu) is for the sake of cutting away doubt. The endeavor (pravṛtti) towards a variegated (vicitra) emanation [i.e., the endeavor to emanate a variegated universe] of even he [i.e., Brahman] who is completely fulfilled (paripūrṇa) is singularly play (līlā) alone, and not, rather, preceded by pursuit of a result for himself. Here, the example is ‘like a person’s’ (lokavat) [endeavor]. [The suffix] Vat is in the sixth case. As [an act of] play (līlā), such as dancing, on the part of a person inebriated with joy, which is independent of [any pursuit of] a result [to be attained by performing such an act of play] on account of an abundance of joy [being felt by the person and inspiring the person to perform such an act of play] is observable [in the world], so on the part of Īśvara [such an act of play is also observable]. Therefore, the play [of Īśvara] is verily natural to the bliss of [his] essential nature (svarūpa), as per the statement (śruti) in the Māṇḍūkya [-kārikā (1.9) of Gauḍapādācārya], ‘This [i.e., the emanation—the universe] is verily the nature (svabhāva) of Deva; what longing does one of fulfilled desire have? [i.e., there is no cause for the emanation of the universe because the emanator, Deva, has no unfulfilled desire that has given rise to an endeavor to emanate the universe; the universe simply exists as an expression of Īśvara’s inherent nature]’ and as per the [statement in the] Smṛti-śāstra [i.e., Nārāyaṇa-saṁhitā], ‘Without reference to a motive whatsoever, Hari performs the emanation and so forth [of the universe] out of bliss alone like an inebriated person’s dancing. Where is the notion of a motive in this regard for he who is possessed of complete bliss? Even the liberated are possessed of fulfilled desires. So how much more so shall this be so for he who is the Self of all?’ And it not that here because of this example [of an inebriated person] non-omniscience [on the part of Īśvara] is occurrent [since an inebriated person lacks complete awareness] because of acceptance [of the example only] to this extent, ‘Without pursuit of a result, he plays on account of [feeling] an abundance of bliss’ [i.e., the example of the dancing of an inebriated person is intended to be applied only in regard to the character of the endeavor (pravṛtti) of dancing the person is said to perform; the aspect of inebriation in the person is not meant to be construed to imply that Īśvara lacks awareness as an inebriated person does] on account of an occurrence of that [i.e., non-omniscience] in deep sleep and so on even in the example of exhalation and inhalation [which is given by the Kevalādvaitavādīs, i.e., in the example given by other commentators the same objection would also apply, so it should be accepted that in neither case is the example meant to imply non-omniscience]. The example [given by the Viśiṣṭādvaidavādīs] of the king [i.e., prince, playing with a ball] is not accepted because of the pleasure produced by such play being a result [i.e., because a prince who plays with a ball can be understood to indeed have motive for his play even though play is generally considered to be constituted of acts that don’t have practical purpose: the the prince plays with the motive of experiencing the pleasure produced by the act of play; this fault does not occur, however, in the example of the dancing of an inebriated person because the act of dancing is an outcome of bliss rather than a act performed in pursuit of bliss].”