न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात् ।
na karmāvibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt |
(Vedānta-sūtra: 2.1.35)
“‘No, [Brahman cannot be said to be free from partiality or cruelty just by making reference to karma] because of the non-distinction of karma [from Brahman prior to the emanation of the universe].’ If this [objection is raised], [then to that it is said] no, [karma is not simply undivided prior to the emanation of the universe] because of [karma’s] being beginningless [i.e., because of karma’s becoming recurrently distinguished from Brahman in each successive emanation of the universe in accord with its state at the end of each previous emanation of the universe in a perpetual cycle without beginning].”
Commentary
nanu karmaṇā vaiṣamyādi-parihāro na syāt | kutaḥ? karmāvibhāgāt | ‘sad eva saumyedam’ ity ādiṣu prāk sṛṣṭer brahma-vibhaktasya karmaṇo’pratīter iti cet, na | kutaḥ? karmaṇaḥ kṣetrajñānāṁ ca brahmavad anāditva-svīkārāt | pūrva-pūrva-karmānusāreṇottarottara-karmaṇi pravartanāt na kiñcid dūṣaṇam | smṛtiś ca—‘puṇya-pāpādikaṁ viṣṇuḥ kārayet pūrva-karmaṇā | anāditvāt karmaṇaś ca na virodhaḥ kathañcana ||’ iti |karmaṇo’nāditvenānavasthā tu na doṣaḥ prāmānikatvāt | na ca karma-sāpekṣatveneśvarasyāsvātantryam | dravyaṁ karma ca kālaś cety ādinā karmādi-sattāyās tad-adhīnatva-smaraṇāt | na ca ghaṭṭa-kuḍyāṁ prabhātam iti vācyam | anādi-jīva-svabhāvānusāreṇa hi karma kārayati, svabhāvam anyathā-kartuṁ samartho’pi kasyāpi na karotīty aviṣamo bhaṇyate |
(Govinda-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra: 2.1.35)
“[An objection is raised:] ‘Well, refutation of partiality and so forth cannot occur [just] by [reference to] karma. Why? Because of the non-distinction (avibhāgāt) of karma, that is, because of the unintelligibility of karma [as being] differentiated from Brahman prior to the emanation [of the universe], in [accord with the statement in Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.1]: ‘O gentle one, this [i.e., Brahman] alone existed before [the emanation].’ If this [objection is raised], [then to that it is said] no. Why? Because of acceptance of the beginninglessness (anāditva), like Brahman, of karma and the knowers of the field [i.e., the jīvas]. Because of [Brahman’s] engaging [the jīvas] in subsequent karma in accord with [the jīvas’] prior karma, there is no fault at all [in Brahman]. The Smṛti too [says this]: ‘Viṣṇu causes piety, sin, and so on in accord with prior karma, and because of karma’s being beginningless, there is no contradiction by any means.’ The infinite regress (anavasthā) on account of karma’s being beginningless, however, is not a fault because of [its] being established by evidence [i.e., because that beginninglessness can be understood, as naiyāyikas have explained, to have tangible existence by reference to phenomena in the world, such as the relation of seed and sprout, which also exist as mutual cause and effect of one another in a beginningless sequence]. And it is not that Īśvara has a lack of independence because of [his] being dependent on [jīvas’] karma [i.e., because of his invariably prompting the jīvas to act in accord with their karma] because of statements in the Smṛti-śāstra of the existence of karma and so forth being dependent on him, such as [SB 2.5.14], ‘The elements, karma, time, the disposition (svabhāva), and the jīva—there is actually no other object distinct from Vāsudeva, O brāhmaṇa [i.e., the elements, karma, time, the disposition (svabhāva), and the jīva are all dependent on Bhagavān because of their being his śaktis or effects thereof].’ And it is not that ‘morning at the toll station’ is to be stated [in this regard, i.e., it is that a mere roundabout attempt to evade a problem has resulted only in having to confront the same problem again later, meaning, it is not that by saying that karma and so forth are dependent on Brahman that again the objection that he is partial and cruel can be leveled at him because he in that case has the independent capacity to overwrite the karma of jīvas that results in their suffering]. Brahman causes karma to be performed in accord with the beginningless dispositions (svabhāvas) of the jīvas; although capable of changing the disposition [of the jīvas], he does not [do that] for anyone. Thus, he is said to be non-partial [i.e., fair towards everyone and not cruel for ensuring that all jīvas duly experience their beginningless karma in accord with their beginningless dispositions (svabhāvas)].”