Śrīmad Bhāgavatam

parānandane pravṛttir dvidhā jāyate—parato nijābhīṣṭa-sampattyai, kvacit tad-abhīṣṭa-mātra-sampattyai ca | tatra prathamo nātrāpy ayuktaḥ svātmārtha-mātratayā kutrāpi pakṣapātābhāvāt | atrottara-pakṣe para-sukhasya para-duḥkhasya cānubhavenaiva parānukūlyenaiva pravṛttīcchā jāyate, na tu yat-kiñcij-jñāna-mātreṇa, cittasya para-duḥkhāsparśe kṛpā-rūpa-vikārāsambhavāt | yathā kaṇṭaka-viddhāṅgo jantor necchati tāṁ vyathām | jīva-sāmyaṁ gato liṅgair na tathāviddha-kaṇṭakaḥ || iti nyāyāt | tataś ca sadā paramānandaika-rūpe’pahata-kalmaṣe bhagavati prākṛtasya sukhābhidha-duḥkhasya prasiddha-duḥkhasya ca sūrye pecaka-cakṣur jyotiṣa iva tamasa iva cātyantābhāvāt tat-tad-anubhavo nāsty eva | yat tu bhagavati duḥkha-sambandhaṁ parijihīrṣanto’pi kecid evaṁ vadanti—tasmin duḥkhānubhava-jñānam asty eva | tac ca parakīyatvenaiva bhāsate, na tu svīyatveneti | tad api ghaṭṭakuṭyāṁ prabhātam | duḥkhānubhavo nāma hy antaḥkaraṇe duḥkha-sparśaḥ, sa ca svasmād bhavatu, parasmād veti, duḥkha-sambandhāviśeṣāt | asarvajñatā-doṣaś ca sūrya-dṛṣṭāntenaiva parihṛtaḥ pratyuta guṇatvenaiva darśitaś ca | kvacid gajendrādīnām api prākṛta eva duḥkhe “sa eva mama śaraṇam” ity-ādinā tathaiva bhaktir udbhūtaiveti | kvacid yamalārjunādiṣu śrī-nāradādi-bhaktānāṁ bhaktiḥ sphuṭaiveti ca sarvathā dainyātmaka-bhakta-bhakty-anubhava eva taṁ karuṇayati, na tu prākṛtaṁ duḥkhaṁ, yogye kāraṇe saty ayogyasya kalpanānaucityāt, duḥkha-sad-bhāvasyaiva kāraṇatve sarva-saṁsārocchitteḥ | atha tasya paramparā-kāraṇatvam asty eva cet—astu, na kāpi hānir iti | tasmād ubhayathā bhaktānandane tad-bhakty-anubhava eva bhagavantaṁ pravartayatīti siddham | kvacid gajendrādīnām api prākṛta eva duḥkhe “sa eva mama śaraṇam” ity-ādinā tathaiva bhaktir udbhūtaiveti | kvacid yamalārjunādiṣu śrī-nāradādi-bhaktānāṁ bhaktiḥ sphuṭaiveti ca sarvathā dainyātmaka-bhakta-bhakty-anubhava eva taṁ karuṇayati, na tu prākṛtaṁ duḥkhaṁ, yogye kāraṇe saty ayogyasya kalpanānaucityāt, duḥkha-sad-bhāvasyaiva kāraṇatve sarva-saṁsārocchitteḥ | atha tasya paramparā-kāraṇatvam asty eva cet—astu, na kāpi hānir iti | tasmād ubhayathā bhaktānandane tad-bhakty-anubhava eva bhagavantaṁ pravartayatīti siddham |
(Excerpt from Paramātma Sandarbha: 93)

“An action pleasing to another comes about in two ways: for the sake of procuring a desired object of one’s own from the other, and sometimes, only for the sake of procuring a desired object for the other. Therein, the first is inapplicable here [i.e., in regard to the query as to whether Bhagavān exhibits partiality towards anyone in the world] as well because of the absence of partiality in any case on account of [such an action] being solely for the sake of one’s self [i.e., there is no partiality in such an action because its objective is entirely for oneself and thus not for any other particular person in preference to a third party]. Here in the latter case, the desire for an action with favorability solely towards another [i.e., an action free from any self-interest performed solely in the interest of another] comes about only by [having had] experience of another’s happiness and another’s suffering, and not rather, just by some general awareness [of it], because of the impossibility of the transformation of the heart in the form of grace without the touch of another’s suffering [upon the heart], as per the following reasoning [described in SB 10.10.14]: ‘As one whose body has been pricked by a thorn does not desire that pain for a living being [i.e., does not want that another living being should suffer such pain] upon having understood through indications [e.g., contraction of the face, etc.] the likeness of living beings [in regard to their sensitivity to pleasure and pain], so one who has never been pricked by a thorn does not [i.e., one who has never suffered that pain does not have the ability to desire that others do not suffer it because one has no experience of that pain in the first place].’ And therefore, because of the complete absence of the material suffering called pleasure (sukha) and the suffering which is well-known [to simply be suffering] in Bhagavān, who is solely supreme bliss in form [i.e., nature] and repellant of sin eternally—like [the complete absence] an owl’s eye’s sight, or darkness, in the presence of the sun—there is no experience of these [i.e., of material suffering and so-called pleasure in Bhagavān] whatsoever. Be that as it may, even some who wish to deny [the existence of] a relation with suffering in Bhagavān speak as follows: ‘There is certainly awareness of the experience of suffering in him, yet that manifests only as another’s [experience], and not rather as his own [i.e., Bhagavān does have awareness of the experience of material suffering, but that experience is another’s and not his own direct experience].’ This too [however] is daybreak at the toll-station [i.e., it is an unsuccessful attempt to evade a problem that has resulted only in more labor for oneself]. Experience of suffering most certainly means the touch of suffering upon the antaḥkaraṇa (psyche), and that may be from one’s own [suffering] or from another’s, because of the non-distinction in regard to the relation with suffering [i.e., regardless of whether the suffering is one’s own or another’s, if it touches the heart, then the heart is touched by suffering, and thus an experience of suffering has occurred]. And simply by the example of the sun [given earlier that darkness cannot exist in the presence of the sun], non-omniscience is negated as a fault and rather is shown to indeed be a quality [i.e., Bhagavān not being completely omniscient on account of his having no direct personal experience of material suffering is not a fault in him but rather is a quality, just as it is a quality of the sun to be completely free from darkness, since possessing darkness, that is, experience of material suffering, is not a desirable or endearing quality]. Thus, there may be some general awareness of suffering in him, but there is no experience of suffering whatsoever, since even in the presence of [Bhagavān,] he who is the crest-jewel of the supremely compassionate and capable of doing, not doing, and doing otherwise [i.e., capable any and all forms of action as an independent conscious agent] jīvas certainly experience the suffering of saṁsāra even today. Thus, in this regard, negation of cruelty also occurs [i.e., no fault of cruelty can be posited to exist in Bhagavān on account of the jīvas suffering in saṁsāra because Bhagavān has no experience of that suffering and thus cannot be held responsible for not feeling compelled by a sense of compassion to alleviate it]. The happiness of bhaktas, however, is indeed, in form [i.e., in nature], bhakti to him [i.e., the happiness bhaktas feel is caused by, and is part of, their bhakti to Bhagavān], and their suffering occurs only because of obstacles in attaining Bhagavān, and therein [i.e., in the process of encountering such obstacles] greater meltedness of the heart specifically in relation to Bhagavān comes about, and that is bhakti itself [i.e., the suffering felt by bhaktas is ultimately to be considered caused by and part of their bhakti to Bhagavān as well]. Since sometimes bhakti, by means [of resolutions] such as, ‘He alone is my shelter,’ similarly arises in the midst of the entirely material suffering of Gajendra and others, and since sometimes the bhakti of bhaktas such as Nārada becomes manifest in relation to [i.e., as an indirect result of interacting with] the twin arjuna trees and others, in all cases [it is] only experience of the bhakti of bhaktas, constituted of humility (dainya), [that] sorrows him [i.e., evokes his compassion], and not, rather, material suffering, because of the inappropriateness of conceiving of an inapt [cause] when an apt cause is present, since extirpation of the entirety of saṁsāra would occur if merely the existence of suffering were a cause [of Bhagavān’s compassion]. Now, if [one argues], ‘It certainly has indirect causation [i.e., material suffering is certainly, even in the aforementioned examples, an indirect cause of Bhagavān’s grace],’ [then] let it be. There is no harm. Therefore, in both cases [i.e., in the case of material suffering not being considered a cause at all, and in the case of its being considered an indirect cause], it is established that only experience of bhakti to him [i.e., only observing the bhakti bhaktas express towards him] motivates Bhagavān to please [his] bhaktas [i.e., the primary cause of Bhagavān acting to please his bhaktas is never material suffering and, rather, only, their bhakti to him].”

Read on →