Paramātmā

atha paramātmaika-śeṣatveti vyākhyeyam | ekaḥ paramātmano’nyaḥ śeṣo’ṁśaḥ | sa cāsau sa ca eka-śeṣaḥ | paramātmana eka-śeṣaḥ paramātmaika-śeṣaḥ | tasya bhāvas tattvam | tad eva svabhāvaḥ prakṛtir yasya, sa paramātmaika-śeṣatva-svabhāvaḥ | tathā-bhūtaś cāyaṁ sarvadā mokṣa-daśāyām apīty arthaḥ | etādṛśatvaṁ cāsya svataḥ svarūpata eva, na tu paricchedādinā | tadīya-svābhāvikācintya-śaktyā svābhāvika-tadīya-raśmi-paramāṇu-sthānīyatvāt aupādhikāvathāyās tv aṁśena prakṛti-śeṣatvam api bhavati iti ca svata ity asya bhāvaḥ | śakti-rūpatvaṁ cāsya taṭastha-śakty-ātmakatvāt, tathā tadīya-raśmi-sthānīyatve’pi nitya-tad-āśrayitvāt, tad-vyatirekeṇa vyatirekāt, ‘hetur jīvo’sya sargādeḥ’ ity anusāreṇa jagat-sṛṣṭau tat-sādhanatvāt, dravya-svarūpatve’pi pradhāna-sāmyāc cāvagamyate | uktaṁ ca prakṛti-viśeṣatvena tasya śaktitvam—‘viṣṇu-śaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathā parā | avidyā karma-saṁjñākhyā tṛtīyā śaktir ucyate ||’ iti, ‘tayā tirohitatvāc ca śaktiḥ kṣetra-jña-saṁjñitā | sarva-bhūteṣu bhūpāla tāratamyena vartate ||’ iti ca viṣṇu-purāṇe | ‘bhūmir āpo’nalo vāyur’ ity-ādau bhinnā prakṛtir aṣṭadhety anantaram ‘apareyam itas tv anyāṁ prakṛtiṁ viddhi me parām | jīva-bhūtāṁ mahābāho yayedaṁ dhāryate jagat ||’ iti śrī-gītopaniṣatsu ca | ‘viṣṇu-śaktiḥ parā proktā’ ity-ādi viṣṇu-purāṇa-vacane tu tisṝṇām eva pṛthak-śaktitva-nirdeśāt kṣetrajñasyāvidyā-karma-sambandhena śaktitvam iti parāstam, kintu svarūpenaivety āyātam | tathā ca śrī-bhagavad-gītāyām, ‘mamaivāṁśa’ iti | ata eva ‘apareyam itas tv anyām’ ity uktam | ‘kṣetrajña etā manaso vibhūtīḥ’ ity-ādau kṣetrajña-śabdaś ca śuddhe’pi pravartate, kṣetra-śabdasyopalakṣaṇa-mātratvāt | tad evaṁ śaktitve’py anyatvam asya taṭasthatvāt | taṭasthatvaṁ ca māyā-śakty-atītatvāt, asyāvidyā-parābhavādi-rūpeṇa doṣeṇa paramātmano lepābhāvāc cobhaya-koṭāv apraveśāt | tasya tac-chaktitve saty api paramātmanas tal-lepābhāvaś ca yathā kvacid eka-deśa-sthe raśmau chāyayā tiraskṛte’pi sūryasyātiraskāraḥ, tadvat | uktaṁ ca taṭasthatvaṁ śrī-nārada-pañcarātre—‘yat taṭasthaṁ tu cid-rūpaṁ sva-saṁvedyād vinirgatam | rañjitaṁ guṇa-rāgeṇa sa jīva iti kathyate ||’ ity-ādau | ato viṣṇu-purāṇe’py antarāla eva paṭhito’sau | anyatvaṁ ca śrutau, ‘asmān māyī sṛjate viśvam etat tasmiṁś cānyo māyayā sanniruddhaḥ,’ ‘tayor anyaḥ pippalaṁ svādv atti’ ity-ādau | ata evoktaṁ vaiṣṇave—‘vibheda-janake’jñāne nāśam ātyantikaṁ gate | ātmano brahmaṇo bhedam asantaṁ kaḥ kariṣyati ||’ iti | devatva-manuṣyatvādi-lakṣaṇo viśeṣato yo bhedas tasya janake’py ajñāne nāśaṁ gate brahmaṇaḥ paramātmanaḥ sakāśād ātmano jīvasya yo bhedaḥ svābhāvikas taṁ bhedam asantaṁ kaḥ kariṣyati? api tu santaṁ vidyamānam eva sarva eva kariṣyatīty arthaḥ | uttaratra pāṭhe nāsantam ity etasya vidheyatvād anyārthaḥ kaṣṭa-sṛṣṭa eveti mokṣa-daśāyām api tad-aṁśatvāvyabhicāraḥ svābhāvika-śaktitvād eva | ata evāvidyā-vimokṣa-pūrvaka-svarūpāvasthiti-lakṣaṇāyāṁ muktau tal-līnasya tat-sādharmyāpattir bhavati, ‘nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sāmyam upaiti’ ity-ādi-śrutibhyaḥ,‘idaṁ jñānam upāśritya mama sādharmyam āgatāḥ | sarge’pi nopajāyate pralaye na vyathanti ca ||’ iti śrī-gītopaniṣadbhyaś ca | ata eva ‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’ ity-ādiṣu ca brahma-tādātmyam eva bodhayati | svenācintanīya-jñānaṁ bhavati | ‘tat-svābhāvyāpattir upapatteḥ’ itivat | tad evaṁ śaktitve siddhe, śakti-śaktimatoḥ parasparānupraveśāt śaktimad-vyatireke śakti-vyatirekāt cittvāviśeṣāc ca kvacid abheda-nirdeśa ekasminn api vastuni śakti-vaividhya-darśanād bheda-nirdeśaś ca nāsamañjasaḥ |
(Paramātma Sandarbha: 37)

“Now, [the jīva’s] being a singular subsidiary of Paramātmā (Paramātmaika-śeṣatva) [as stated in the verse of Śrī Jāmātṛ Muni under discussion] is to be explained. ‘Singular’ (eka) means distinct from Paramātmā, and ‘subsidiary’ (śeṣa) means a part. ‘Singular subsidiary’ (eka-śeṣa) [thus] means it [i.e., the jīva] is that [i.e., distinct from Paramātmā] and also that [i.e., a subsidiary of Paramātmā]. [Thus] Paramātmaika-śeṣa means a singular subsidiary (eka-śeṣa) [i.e., a distinct part] of Paramātmā. Being that (tat-tva) refers to its [i.e., the jīva’s] existential state (bhāva) [i.e., Paramātmaika-śeṣatva refers to the jīva’s existential state of being a singular subsidiary, that is, a distinct part, of Paramātmā]. [The jīva,] That which has the nature (svabhāva), meaning, constitution (prakṛti), of that specifically, is called a Paramātmaika-śeṣatva-svabhāva. It [i.e., the jīva] being such, furthermore, is ‘forever’ (sarvadā) [as stated in the verse of Śrī Jāmātṛ Muni under discussion], [such that the jīva remains an entity the nature of which is that of a singular subsidiary of Paramātmā (Paramātmaika-śeṣatva)] even in the state of mokṣa. This is the meaning. It’s [i.e., the jīva’s] being such, furthermore, is definitively ‘by its own nature’ (svataḥ) [as stated in the verse of Śrī Jāmātṛ Muni under discussion], that is, because of its own constitution (svarūpa), and not, rather, because of a [supposed] limitation (pariccheda) [thought be imposed on Brahman] or otherwise. On account of [the jīva always in every possible condition] being comparable to an inherent (svābhāvika) light-ray particle belonging to him [i.e., to Paramātmā] by means of his [i.e., Paramātmā’s] inherent (svābhāvika) inconceivable potency (acintya-śakti), [when the jīva is] in an adjunctive [i.e., conditioned] state, on the contrary, [the jīva’s] being a subsidiary (śeṣatva) [i.e., part] of prakṛti [i.e., the material energy, Bhagavān’s māyā-śakti] also occurs partially. Thus, furthermore, ‘by its own nature’ (svataḥ) refers to its [i.e., the jīva’s] existential state (bhāva) [i.e., the existential state (bhāva) of the jīva as a singular subsidiary of Paramātmā is the jīva’s invariable and eternal state of being by virtue of its own nature and this is never controverted by bondage in māyā or liberation from māyā].
“Its [i.e., the jīva’s] being a form [alt., of the nature] of śakti, furthermore, is understood (1) because of [its] being constituted of the taṭastha (intermediary) śakti [of Paramātmā], (2) because of [its] being eternally a dweller (āśrayin) in him [i.e., Paramātmā] even while being comparable to a light-ray of his [i.e., even while being comparable to something that exists outside of him], (3) because of [its] apparent non-existence (vyatireka) as a result of the apparent non-existence of him [i.e., because the jīva ceases to appear to exist when Paramātmā ceases to appear to exist at the time of universal dissolution; or, alternately, (3) because of [the jīva’s] negation (vyatireka) by negation of him [i.e., because the jīva would cease to exist if Paramātmā did not exist since the jīva is an inherent, dependent part of Paramātmā], (4) because of [its] being his [i.e., Paramātmā’s] means (sādhana) in regard to emanation of the universe in accord with [the statement in SB 12.7.18], ‘The cause of the emanation and so forth of this [i.e., of the universe] is the jīva,’ and (5) because of [its] likeness to pradhāna [i.e., prakṛti, the undifferentiated, subtle material energy] even while it has the essential nature (svarūpa) of a substance (dravya) [i.e., of a substratum of qualities, meaning, although the jīva is a specific substance (dravya) possessed of inherent qualities, it bears resemblance to pradhāna in that its inherent qualities are most subtle].
“Its being a śakti because of [its] being a particular fundamental energy (prakṛti) [of Paramātmā] is also stated in Viṣṇu Purāṇa [6.7.61], ‘Viṣṇu’s śakti is called parā (superior), and that [śakti] which is named the kṣetrajña is called aparā (inferior). The other, third śakti is called avidyā and karma,’ [and in VP 6.7.63], ‘Because of being covered by that [i.e., by the third śakti called avidyā and karma], O king, the śakti known as the kṣetrajña is seen in all beings in a gradation [i.e., its influence is perceived to a greater or lesser extent in various living beings even though it is equally present in them all].’ Similarly, after [the statement in BG 7.4] ‘This energy (prakṛti) of mine is divided eightfold as earth, water, fire, air, sky, mind, intellect, and ego,’ in Śrī Gītopaniṣad (7.5) [it is said], ‘This [energy of mine, viz., the māyā-śakti,] is inferior [because it is constituted of inert matter]. O you of mighty arms, other than this, know my energy (prakṛtim) constituted of the jīva [viz., the jīva-śakti], by which this universe is grasped, to be superior [because it is constituted of consciousness].’ Because of the designation of all three [śaktis] as being separate śaktis in the [aforecited] statement of Viṣṇu Purāṇa [in 6.7.61], ‘Viṣṇu’s śakti is called parā (superior) … ’ (Viṣṇu-śaktiḥ parā proktā … ), the knower of the field’s (kṣetrajña’s) being a śakti because of a relation with the [third] śakti known as avidyā karma is refuted. Rather, it [i.e., this conclusion that the jīva, the kṣetrajña, is a śakti of Viṣṇu separate from his parā-śakti and his śakti known as avidyā and karma, i.e., the māyā-śakti] comes about definitively because of its [i.e., the jīva’s] essential nature (svarūpa). Similarly, furthermore, in Śrī Bhagavad-gītā [15.7, it is said], ‘The living being [i.e., the jīva] here is an eternal part of me alone.’ Therefore, it was said [in BG 7.5]. ‘This [energy of mine, viz., the māyā-śakti,] is inferior. Other than this, know my energy (prakṛtim) constituted of the jīva [viz., the jīva-śakti] to be superior.’ The word ‘knower of the field’ (kṣetrajña), furthermore, as [in the case of the usage] in [SB 5.11.12], ‘The kṣetrajña [sees] these splendors of the mind …,’ is also employed for the pure entity (śuddha) [i.e., for the jīva itself in its essential nature irrespective of whether it is in a state of being conditioned by māyā or not] because of the word ‘field’ (kṣetra) being only an indicator (upalakṣaṇa) [i.e., because the word ‘field’ (kṣetra) is used in the case of the word kṣetrajña only for the purpose of indicating who is being referred to, viz., the jīva, and not for the purpose of defining or specifying the essential nature of its referent, viz., the jīva].
“Thus, in this way, its [i.e., the jīva’s] distinctness [from Paramātmā’s other śaktis] even while [also] being a śakti [of Paramātmā] is because of its intermediacy (taṭasthatva). [This] Intermediacy (taṭasthatva), furthermore, is because of [the jīva’s] non-entrance into [i.e., non-inclusion in] either category [i.e., because of the jīva’s being included neither in the category of the parā-śakti nor in the category of the māyā-śakti] (1) because of [the jīva’s] being beyond [i.e., superior to] the māyā-śakti [by virtue of the jīva’s being constituted of consciousness and the māyā-śakti’s being constituted of matter], and (2) because of Paramātmā’s having no taint as a result of the fault in the form of its [i.e., the jīva’s] degradation and so forth by ignorance (avidyā) [i.e., the jīva is understood to be a third śakti of Paramātmā distinct from both the parā-śakti and māyā-śakti because the jīva is superior in constitution to the māyā-śakti by virtue of being a conscious entity yet also dissimilar from the parā-śakti because the jīva is subject to the influence of avidyā, viz., the māyā-śakti, whereas the parā-śakti is not subject to the influence of avidyā and furthermore is the means by which Paramātmā himself remains forever uninfluenced by avidyā]. [Also,] Even while being possessed of that śakti [i.e., the jīva-śakti], Paramātmā has no taint because of that just as there is no concealment of the sun [as a whole] even when a ray [of the sun] situated in one place somewhere is concealed by shade [i.e., is obscured by an object such that the area where it would have appeared instead appears dark].
“The intermediacy (taṭasthatva) [of the jīva] is also stated in Śrī Nārada Pañcarātra, ‘That which is intermediary (taṭastham), conscious in nature (cid-rūpam), issued forth from that which can be known by [only] itself [i.e., issued forth from its basis, viz., Śrī Bhagavān, who can be known only when he makes himself known], and colored by attachment to qualities (guṇas) is called the jīva.’ Thus, in Viṣṇu Purāṇa as well, it [i.e., the jīva] is said to be definitively in a [qualitatively] intermediate space [i.e., to be a distinct, intermediate type of śakti]. [The Jīva’s] Distinctness, furthermore is [stated] in the Śruti [i.e., Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad: 4.9], ‘This deluding world is emanated from that [i.e., Brahman], and in it [i.e., the world] the other [viz., the jīva] is bound in full by māyā,’ and [Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad: 3.1.1], ‘Among them [i.e., among the two birds of beautiful plumage, ever-united in friendship, viz., the jīva and Paramātmā, perched on the same tree, i.e., situated within material existence], one [i.e., the jīva] eats the tasty berry [of the tree, and the other, Paramātmā, not eating, watches over the first].’ Therefore, it is said in Viṣṇu Purāṇa (6.7.94), ‘[Even] If the ignorance (ajñāna) that is a cause of specific differences [between living beings in the world] were completely destroyed, who could render non-existent the difference of the self (ātmā) from Brahman?’ [The meaning of the verse is restated:] [Even] If the ignorance (ajñāna) that is even a cause of specific differences in the form of the state of being a deva (devatva), the state of being a human being (manuṣyatva), and so forth, were destroyed, who could render non-existent the inherent difference of the self (ātmā), meaning, the jīva, from Brahman, meaning, Paramātmā?’ Nonetheless [i.e., even if the ignorance that is the cause of perception of the differences between devas, humans, and so on were removed], absolutely everyone would [still] affirm the existence (santam) [of the difference between the jīva and Paramātmā]. In regard to the [mention of] ‘negation of non-existence’ (nāsantam) in the second half of the text, because of its being a predicate (vidheya) [in the sentence], [construing] another meaning [of the text, as has been done in the Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha] is just troublesome fabrication [i.e., far-fetched and untenable]. Thus, the non-deviation from [the jīva’s] being a part (aṁśa) of him [i.e., Paramātmā] even in the state of mokṣa is specifically because of [the jīva’s] being an inherent śakti [of his]. Therefore, in mukti, the characteristic of which is fixity in essential form (svarūpa) preceded by liberation from ignorance (avidyā) [as per SB 2.10.6], he who becomes merged in him [i.e., the jīva who is said to become merged in Paramātmā] enters a state of likeness in nature (sādharmya) with him [i.e., in mukti the jīva does not merge into Paramātmā in such a manner that the jīva ceases to exist as a distinct existent; rather, the jīva ‘merges’ into Paramātmā in the sense that it acquires a likeness in nature (sādharmya) to Paramātmā in certain respects] as per the Śruti [i.e., Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 3.1.3], ‘[When a seer sees the golden-complexioned Maker, Īśa, the Puruṣa, the Source of Brahman, then that wise one casts away virtue and sin, and] Attains taintless, supreme likeness (sāmya) [to the Puruṣa],’ and Śrī Gītopaniṣad (14.2), ‘Those have taken shelter in this knowledge and attained a likeness in nature (sādharmya) to me are not re-born even during the [time of] emanation [of the universe] and are not troubled during the [time of] dissolution [of the universe].’ Therefore, in [statements such as Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad: 3.2.9], ‘One who knows Brahman verily becomes Brahman,’ and so forth, only a sameness in nature (tādātmya) with Brahman is conveyed, and awareness (jñāna) of that which is unable to be conceived of manifests of its own accord as per [the sūtra stated in VS 3.1.23], ‘There is an occurrence of likeness with that because of reasoning’ (tat-svābhāvyāpattir upapatteḥ).
“Thus, in this way, with [the jīva’s] being a śakti [of Paramātmā] having been established, there is no disharmony (asamañjasa) when sometimes there is a designation [of the jīva] as non-distinct (abhinna) [from Paramātmā] (1) because of the mutual interpervasion of a śakti and the possessor of the śakti (śaktimat), (2) because of the apparent non-existence (vyatireka) of a śakti as a result of the apparent non-existence of the possessor of the śakti (śaktimat), and (3) because of the non-difference [between the jīva and Paramātmā] of being [constituted of] consciousness (cit), and [sometimes there is] a designation [of the jīva] as distinct (bhinna) [from Paramātmā] because of observation of the variegation of śakti [i.e., of there being a multitude of śaktis possessed of distinct characteristics being present] even within one existent [viz., Paramātmā].”

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