na hi śabda-jñānino brahma-vittvaṁ
na hi śabda-jñānino brahma-vittvaṁ, kintu tad-anubhāvina eva | na ca madhu madhuram iti śābdī-pratītim upetas tan-mādhurya-vid bhavati | … tathā ca śābda-jñānād anyaivopāsanā | bhakty-anubhava-pada-vācyā vidyā puruṣārtha-hetuḥ | … śābda-jñānaṁ tu vairāgyam iva tat-parikara-bhūtam | … nanu kāya-vāṅ-mano-vyāpāra-rūpā bhaktiḥ | tatra mānasasya dhyānasyānubhavatvaṁ bhavet | kāya-vāg-vyāpāra-rūpasyārcana-japādes tattvaṁ katham iti ced, ucyate–hlādinī-sāra-samaveta-saṁvid-rūpā bhaktiḥ ‘sac-cid-ānandaika-rase bhakti-yoge tiṣṭhati’ iti śruteḥ | itarathā bhagavad-vaśīkāra-hetur asau na syāt | tathābhūtāyās tasyā bhakta-kāyādi-vṛtti-tādātmyenāvirbhūtāyā kriyākāratvaṁ cit-sukha-mūrteḥ kuntalādi-pratīkatvavad avaseyam | ‘śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt’ iti nyāyenālaukike’cintye’rthe tarkas tu nirākṛtaḥ |
(Govinda-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra 3.4.12)
“It is not that knowers of the words [i.e., the words of śāstra] are [actual] knowers of Brahman, but rather that only those who have experience of it [i.e., of Brahman] are. It is not that one who possess semantic knowledge based on the statement, ‘Honey is sweet’ becomes a knower of its sweetness [i.e., as only coming to know through language that a substance known as honey is sweet is different from actually experiencing its sweetness, so mere theoretical knowledge of Brahman is distinct from actual experience of Brahman]. … Furthermore, upāsanā [i.e., the process to realize Brahman] is certainly distinct from [mere] knowledge derived from words. Knowledge (vidyā) the referent of which is experience (anubhava) [of Brahman] brought about by bhakti, is the cause of [attaining] the goal of human life (puruṣātha). … Knowledge derived from words, like vairāgya, is an assisting element [of Brahma-vidyā, i.e., it is not Brahma-vidyā itself].” … [An objection is raised:] ‘Well, bhakti is of the nature of operation of the body, speech, and mind. Therein, meditation in the mind could be [considered to be] of the nature of awareness (anubhava), but how could arcana, japa, and so forth, which are of the nature of operation of the body and speech, be of that nature [i.e., be of the nature of awareness (anubhava)]? If [this question is raised, then to that], it is to be said that bhakti is of the nature of awareness (saṁvit) combined with the essence of bliss (hlādinī), as per the Śruti [i.e., GTU 2.78], ‘[He who is of the nature of condensed awareness and condensed bliss, i.e., Śrī Bhagavān] Dwells in bhakti-yoga, which is of the nature of eternal being, consciousness, and bliss.’ Otherwise [i.e., were this not the case], it [i.e., bhakti], would not be a cause of captivation of Bhagavān. Existent as such and manifested with a sameness in nature (tādātmya) [i.e., an acquired, non-ontological, functional oneness] with the functions of a bhakta’s body and so forth [i.e., speech], its [i.e., bhakti’s] being possessed of a form as action [i.e., its being so also manifested as the acts of japa, arcana, and so forth] is to be understood, like hair and so forth’s being a part of the embodiment of consciousness and bliss [i.e., just as the hair and nails of Śrī Bhagavān are understood to be part of his body even though they are perceived to change more so that other parts of his body, to lack the sensitivity found in other parts of his body, to be able to be removed from his body without him loosing his essence, and so on, so bhakti which is essentially of the nature of awareness is to be understood to also manifest in the form of actions performed by the body and speech]. In accord with the principle [stated in VS 2.1.27], ‘It is because of Śruti [i.e., because of the statements in the śāstra] on account of śabda’s [i.e., śabda-pramāṇa’s] being the source [of valid knowledge of Brahman]’ (śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt), argument (tarka) is verily annulled in regard to an otherworldly and inconceivable object [e.g., bhakti].”