vaktur icchā tu tātparyaṁ parikīrtitam
vaktur icchā tu tātparyaṁ parikīrtitam |
(Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī: 84)
“The wish of the speaker is said to be the ‘intent’ (tātparyam).”
Nyāya-śāstra
sukhaṁ tu jagatām eva kāmyaṁ dharmeṇa jāyate
sukhaṁ tu jagatām eva kāmyaṁ dharmeṇa jāyate |
adharma-janyaṁ duḥkhaṁ syāt pratikūlaṁ sacetasām ||
nirduḥkhatve sukhe cecchā taj-jñānād eva jāyate |
icchā tu tad-upāye syād iṣṭopāyatva-dhīr yadi ||
(Bhāṣa-pariccheda: 145–146)
“Pleasure (sukha), that which is the entire world’s object of desire, arises by means of merit (dharma). Pain (duḥkha), which is produced by demerit (adharma), shall be [defined as] that which is unpleasant (pratikūla) for all conscious beings. Desire for painlessness and pleasure arises specifically from knowledge of these, whereas desire shall come about for a means to these [i.e., to painlessness and pleasure] if there is awareness of [something’s] instrumentality to that which is desired [viz., painlessness and pleasure].”
sṛṣṭy-ādikaṁ harir naiva prayojanam apekṣya tu
sṛṣṭy-ādikaṁ harir naiva prayojanam apekṣya tu |
kurute kevalānandād yathā martyasya nartanam ||
pūrṇānandasya tasyeha prayojana-matiḥ kutaḥ |
muktā apy āpta-kāmāḥ syuḥ kim u tasyākhilātmanaḥ ||
(Nārāyaṇa-saṁhitā; cited in Bhagavat Sandarbha: 47; Paramātma Sandarbha: 93; Govinda-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra: 2.1.32)
“Without reference to a motive whatsoever, Hari performs the emanation and so forth [of the universe] out of bliss alone like an inebriated person’s dancing [which occurs as a result of bliss and not for the sake of attaining bliss]. Where is the notion of a motive in this regard for he who is possessed of complete bliss? Even the liberated shall be possessed of fulfilled desires. So how much more so shall this be so for he who is the Self of all?”
sarveṣām anukūla-vedanīyaṁ sukham
sarveṣām anukūla-vedanīyaṁ sukham | pratikūla-vedanīyaṁ duḥkham |
(Tarka-saṅgraha: 55–56)
“That which is perceptible as favorable by all is [called] happiness (sukham). That which is perceptible as unfavorable [by all] is [called] suffering (duḥkha).”
yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam
yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam |
(Nyāya-sūtra: 1.1.24)
“The object in regard to which one acts is [called] the aim (prayojana).”
uddiṣṭasya tattva-vyavacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇam
uddiṣṭasya tattva-vyavacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇam |
(Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtra: 1.1.3)
“A characteristic distinguishing of the nature of a stated object [from the nature of all other objects] is [called] a lakṣaṇa.”
para-matam apratiṣiddham anumatam
para-matam apratiṣiddham anumatam |
(Tantra-yukti: 28; cited in Vātsyānana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya on the Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama)
“Another’s view that is not negated is approved.”
pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām
pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām |
āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmānāṁ vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā ||
(Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya on Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra: 1.1.1)
“Ānvīkṣikī [i.e., logic (nyāya)] is stated in the enumeration of sciences [i.e., fields of knowledge] to be the lamp of all sciences (vidyās), the means for [accomplishing] all karmas, and the basis of all dharmas.”
avijñāta-tattve’rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattva-jñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ
avijñāta-tattve’rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattva-jñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ |
(Nyāya-sūtra: 1.1.40)
“Tarka is [a type of] deliberation in the form of demonstration [i.e., proposition] of causes for the purpose of [attaining] knowledge of the nature (tattva) of an object the nature of which is unknown.”