yatnenāpādito’py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ |
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate ||
(Vākya-padīya: 1.34; cited in Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu: 1.1.46)
“Even a meaning established with assiduity by expert logicians is refuted [lit., proven to be otherwise] by others more proficient [in various forms of reasoning].”
sarva-prapañcātītānāṁ teṣāṁ vaikuṇṭha-vāsinām |
tasya vaikuṇṭha-lokasya tasya tan-nāyakasya ca ||
tāni māhātmya-jātāni prapañcāntargataiḥ kila |
dṛṣṭāntair nopayujyante na śakyante ca bhāṣitum ||
tathāpi bhavato brahman prapañcāntargatasya hi |
prapañca-parivārāntardṛṣṭi-garbhita-cetasaḥ ||
tad-dṛṣṭānta-kulenaiva tat tat syād bodhitaṁ sukham |
tathety ucyeta yat kiñcit tad-āgaḥ kṣamatāṁ hariḥ ||
(Bṛhad Bhāgavatāmṛta: 2.4.40–43)
“The greatnesses of the residents of Vaikuṇṭha beyond the entire phenomenal world, of Vaikuṇṭhaloka, and of its master [i.e., Vaikuṇṭhanātha, who like Vaikuṇṭhaloka and its residents is so also beyond the entire phenomenal world] are certainly not fit, and not able, to be described with examples from within the phenomenal world. Still, O brāhmaṇa, for you who are within the phenomenal world and the inner vision [i.e., awareness] of whose mind is filled with the coverings of the phenomenal world, those [greatnesses] can be easily made known only through such examples [i.e., examples drawn from the phenomenal world]. ‘It may be said to be such.’ May Hari forgive the offense of whatever may be said as such [i.e., whatever may be said of those greatnesses by means of stating examples drawn from the phenomenal world, such as, ‘He [i.e., Bhagavān] is like an emperor’].”
tāre kahe—kene kara kutarkānumāna? |
śāstra-viruddhārtha kabhu nā haya pramāṇa ||
(Caitanya-caritāmṛta: 1.2.73)
“To that, it is said, ‘Why do you make an inference based on fallacious reasoning? A meaning that is contrary to śāstra is never authentic [i.e., a valid means of knowing the object of knowledge].”
dvy-arthaiḥ padaiḥ piśunayec ca rahasya-vastu |
(Unknown source; cited from a kāma-śāstra in Kāvya-prakāśa, Sāhitya-darpaṇa, and the Vaiṣṇavānandinī-ṭīkā to Śrīmad Bhāgavatam: 10.33.26)
“One should indicate a confidential matter with words that have a double meaning.”
labdhātmikā satī rūḍhir bhaved yogāpahāriṇī |
kalpanīyā tu labhate nātmānaṁ yoga-bādhataḥ ||
(Kumārila Bhaṭṭa; cited in Jīva Gosvāmī’s ṭīkā to Brahma-saṁhitā: 5.1)
“The acquired conventional meaning (rūḍhi-artha) [of a word] overrides its etymological meaning (yoga-artha). A word meaning should not be supposed [through etymology] when there is an obstruction to its own etymological meaning [by the conventional meaning in the context of the word’s usage].”
rūḍhir yogam apaharati iti nyāya |
(Unknown source; cited in Kṛṣṇa Sandarbha 106)
“Conventional meaning (rūḍhi) supersedes etymological meaning (yoga).”
vyāvṛttir vyavahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam |
(Tarka-dīpikā; Amṛta-ṭīkā on Hari-nāmāṛta-vyākaraṇa: 45)
“The purpose of a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) is differentiation [of the object possessing the characteristic from other objects] and [determining the practical] usage [of the object].”
lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyāṁ vastu-siddhiḥ, na tu kevala-pratijñā-mātreṇa |
(Unknown Source)
“Determination of an object arises from characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), not merely by an assertion.”
virodho vākyayor yatra nāprāmāṇyaṁ tad iṣyate |
yathāviruddhatā ca syāt tathārthaḥ kalpyate tayoḥ ||
(Kūrma Puraṇa: 1.5.327; cited in Laghu Bhāgavatāmṛta: 1.5.327)
“When there is a contradiction between statements [in śāstra], that is not [to be] considered [an instance of] inauthenticity [i.e., one statement should not be considered inauthentic and only the other one authentic]. A meaning of both [statements, rather,] whereby no contradiction arises should be formulated.”
adhikārī ca sambandho viṣayaś ca prayojanam |
avaśyam eva vaktavyaṁ śāstrādau tu catuṣṭayam ||
(Unknown Source; cited in the Amṛta-ṭīkā to Hari-nāmāmṛta-vyākaraṇam: Maṅgalācaraṇa, 1)
“The eligible person (adhikārī) [to read the text], the relationship (sambandha) [between the text and the subject], the subject (viṣaya) [of the text], and the purpose (prayojana) [of the text]—these four [which are known as the anubandha-catuṣṭaya] must be stated at the beginning of a śāstra.”
