yaḥ sāṅkhya-paṅkena kutarka-pāṁśunā
vivarta-gartena ca lupta-dīdhitim |
śuddhaṁ vyadhād vāk-sudhayā maheśvaraṁ
kṛṣṇaṁ sa jīvaḥ prabhur astu me gatiḥ ||
(Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s ṭīkā on Tattva-sandarbha: 1.4)
“With the nectar of his words, Śrī Jīva Prabhu revealed the Supreme Lord, Kṛṣṇa, whose effulgence had been hidden by the mud of Sāṅkhya, the dust of fallacious logic (kutarka, i.e, Nyāya), and the ditch of Vivarta [i.e., Māyāvāda]. May he be my shelter.”
yeṣāṁ tu mate muktāv ānandānubhavo nāsti, teṣāṁ pum-arthatā na sampadyate | sato’pi vastunaḥ sphuraṇābhāve nirarthakatvāt | na ca sukham ahaṁ syām iti kasyacid icchā, kintu sukham ahan anubhavāmi ity eva | tataś ca pravṛtty-abhāvāt tādṛśa-puruṣārtha-sādhana-preraṇāpi śāstre vyarthaiva syāt | tan-mate kevalānanda-rūpasyājñāna-duḥkha-sambandhāsambhavāt tan-nivṛtti-rūpaś ca puruṣārtho na ghaṭate | vigītaṁ tv īdṛśa-puruṣārthatvaṁ prācīnabarhiṣaṁ prati śrī-nārada-vākye ‘duḥkha-hāniḥ sukhāvāptiḥ śreyas tan neha ceṣyate’ iti | tasmād asty evānubhavaḥ | tathā ca śrutiḥ—‘rasaṁ hy evāyaṁ labdhvānandī bhavati’ iti | ‘ātma-ratiḥ ātma-krīḍaḥ’ ity ādiś ca |
(Prīti Sandarbha: 5)
“The quality of being the puruṣārtha cannot be established in the mukti of those [i.e., the proponents of Kevalādvaitavāda] in whose view there is no experience of bliss [in mukti] because of the uselessness even of an existent object in the absence of manifestation [of it, i.e., since something is effectively non-existent when it is existent yet unmanifest and thus unable to be experienced, a form of mukti wherein one is said to have the nature of being happiness yet no have any actual experience of that happiness cannot qualify as the puruṣārtha since the puruṣārtha is not just happiness but rather the experience of happiness]. Furthermore, no one’s desire is, ‘Let me become happiness.’ Rather, it is only, ‘I shall experience happiness.’ Therefore, furthermore, because of the absence of an impetus (pravṛtti) [i.e., because no one would have any motivation to pursue a supposed puruṣārtha wherein there is no experience of bliss since the pursuit of bliss is the fundamental impetus of every living being], even the directives in the śāstra for [taking up] a means (sādhana) to [attaining] such a puruṣārtha [i.e., such a supposed puruṣārtha devoid of the experience of bliss] would just go in vain. Because of the impossibility in their [i.e., the Kevalādvaitavādīs’] view of one whose form is bliss alone having a relation with ignorance and suffering, a puruṣārtha in the form of the cessation of these [i.e., of ignorance and suffering] also does not occur [according to them]. Such being the puruṣārtha [i.e., this idea of the Kevalādvaitavādīs that the puruṣārtha is neither the attainment of bliss nor the cessation of suffering], however, is contradicted in a statement of Śrī Nārada to Prācīnabarhi [in SB 4.25.4], ‘The highest good (śreyas) is the elimination of suffering and attainment of happiness, and that is not attainable here [i.e., by means of karma performed with a mind attached to worldly ends].’ Therefore, there is certainly experience [of bliss in mokṣa, that is, in the puruṣārtha]. Furthermore, there is also the Śruti [i.e., statements in the śāstra such as Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.7.1], ‘Only upon attaining this rasa [i.e., the Supreme Entity] does one become blissful,’ and [Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.25.2], ‘One [then] has delight in the self and play in the self.’”
tatra jīveśvarayor atyantābhede yugapad avidyā-vidyāśrayatvādy-anupapattiś ca pūrvaṁ vivṛtā | ‘tat tvam asi’ ity ādau lakṣaṇā tv atyantābhede tad-aṁśatve ca samānaiva | parama-tattvasya niraṁśatva-śrutis tu dvidhā pravartate | tatra kevala-viśeṣya-lakṣaṇa-nirdeśa-parāyā mukhyaiva pravṛttiḥ, ānanda-mātratvāt tasya | ānandaika-rūpasya tasya svarūpa-śakti-viśiṣṭasya nirdeśa-parāyās tu prākṛtāṁśa-leśa-rāhitya-mātre tātparyād gauṇī pravṛttiḥ | sarva-śakti-viśiṣṭasya tasya tu sarvāṁśitvaṁ gītam eva |
(Prīti Sandarbha: 5)
“The inconclusive argumentation (anupapatti) of ignorance (avidyā) and knowledge (vidyā) having shelter simultaneously [in the same existent (vastu)] and so forth [i.e., and other such untenable conclusions] in [the view of] absolute non-distinction between the jīva and Īśvara [which has been promulgated by Kevalādvaitavādīs] has also been explained earlier [in Paramātma Sandarbha]. In regard to [the statement in CHU 6.8.7], ‘You are that’ (tat tvam asi), indication (lakṣaṇā) [i.e., a figurative sense] is equally present in [the view of there being] absolute non-distinction [of the jīva from Īśvara] and in [the view of the jīva’s] being a part (aṁśa) of him [i.e., Īśvara].
“The Śruti [i.e., the declaration in the śāstra] of the Supreme Entity (Parama-tattva) being without parts (niraṁśa) indeed conveys a twofold sense [i.e., a primary and a secondary sense]. Therein, the primary sense (mukhya-pravṛtti) is focused on designation of the nature of the qualificand (viśeṣya) alone on account of its [i.e., the qualificand’s, meaning, the Supreme Entity’s,] being solely [constituted of] bliss, whereas the secondary sense (gauṇī-pravṛtti) is focused on designation of it [i.e., the qualificand, the Supreme Entity] as a form purely of bliss replete with its inherent potency (svarūpa-śakti) on the basis of an intention (tātparya) specifically related to the absence of [even] a trace of a material (prākṛta) part (aṁśa) [in the Supreme Entity]. Replete with all potency (śakti), its [i.e., the Supreme Entity’s] being the bearer of all parts [i.e., being the Supreme Whole of whom all else is part] is certainly proclaimed [in the śāstra].”
jīvākhya-samaṣṭi-śakti-viśiṣṭasya parama-tattvasya khalv aṁśa eko jīvaḥ | sa ca tejo-maṇḍalasya bahiścara-raśmi-paramāṇur iva parama-cid-eka-rasasya tasya bahiścara-cit-paramāṇuḥ | tatra tasya vyāpakatvāt tad-ekadeśatvam eva jīve syāt | nirākāratayā tad-ekadeśatvaṁ na viruddham | tathāpi bahiścaratvaṁ tad-āśrayitvāt | taj-jñānābhāvāt chāyayā raśmivat māyayābhibhāvyatvāc ca bahiścaratvaṁ vyapadiśyate | raśmi-sthānīyatvaṁ ca tad-vyatirekād vyatirekitayā yas tad-āśrayi-bhāvaḥ | yā ca pūrva-yuktyā bahiścaratve’py eka-vastutva-śrutis tad-ādibhir gamyate | raśmi-sthānīyatvaṁ ca tad-vyatirekād vyatirekitayā yas tad-āśrayi-bhāvaḥ | yā ca pūrva-yuktyā bahiścaratve’py eka-vastutva-śrutis tad-ādibhir gamyate | śaktitvaṁ ca tad-rūpatayaiva tadīya-līlopakaraṇatvāt | aṇutvaṁ ca śabdāt hari-candana-binduvat tasya prabhāva-lakṣaṇa-guṇenaiva sarva-deha-vyāpteḥ | sarvaṁ caitat paramasyācintya-śaktimayatvād aviruddham iti pūrvaṁ dṛḍhīkṛtam asti, ‘śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt’ iti nyāyena, ‘eka-deśa-sthitasyāgner’ ity ādinā ca |
(Prīti Sandarbha: 5)
“A single jīva is just a part (aṁśa) of the Supreme Entity (Parama-tattva), who is possessed of the collective potency (samaṣṭi-śakti) known as jīva [viz., the jīva-śakti, i.e., each jīva is one of innumerable other jīvas, all of whom are constituted of the Supreme Entity’s potency that collectively constitutes all these jīvas and is known as the ‘jīva-śakti’]. That [i.e., one jīva], furthermore, like an outdwelling, minute particle in a ray of the sun, is an outdwelling minute particle of consciousness (cit) of that [i.e., of the Supreme Entity] who is constituted of one substance, [viz.,] supreme consciousness (cit). In this regard, because of its [i.e., the Supreme Entity’s] being all-pervading, only a localization (ekadeśatva) of it can exist in a jīva [i.e., because the Supreme Entity is all-pervading and an all-pervading entity cannot be contained in full within a minute entity, the Supreme Entity in its entirety cannot exist in a jīva, and thus only a localization of it does]. [Moreover,] Because of [its, i.e., the Supreme Entity’s] being formless, its localization is not contradictory [i.e., a localized manifestation of the Supreme Entity existing within each minute jīva is not contrary to the Supreme Entity’s characteristic of being all-pervasive because the Supreme Entity exists all-pervasively without form, that is, without any gross or otherwise delimited form]. Even so [i.e., even though the Supreme Entity pervades the jīva], the outdwellingness [of the jīva to the Supreme Entity, i.e., the jīva’s existing outside the the Supreme Entity’s own primary existence, that is, the Supreme Entity’s own unique, intrinsic constitution] exists because of [the jīva’s] being dependent on it [i.e., on the Supreme Entity]. The outdwellingness [of the jīva in relation to the Supreme Entity] is also designated because of the [jīva’s] absence of awareness of it [i.e., the Supreme Entity], and because of [the jīva’s] being subject to being overpowered by māyā like a ray [is subject to being overpowered] by shadow [i.e., as a ray of the sun can be overpowered by shadow but the sun itself cannot be, so the jīva can be overpowered by māyā but the Supreme Entity cannot be even though the jīva is a part (aṁśa) of the Supreme Entity just as a minute particle in a ray of the sun is a part of the sun].
“The [jīva’s] comparability to a ray, furthermore, is [the jīva’s] being a dependent on it [i.e., on the Supreme Entity] because of [the jīva’s] being an apparent non-existent (vyatirekī) as a result of it’s [i.e., the Supreme Entity’s] apparent non-existence (vyatireka) [i.e., just as rays of the sun disappear when the sun sets but don’t cease to exist, so the jīvas become apparently non-existent when the Supreme Entity becomes apparently non-existent during the cyclic period of universal dissolution; both the jīvas and the Supreme Entity then remain existent until they become apparently existent again during the next cycle of universal emanation]. And although there is outdwellingness [of the jīva] according to the prior [i.e., aforesaid] reasoning, the Śruti [i.e., declaration in the śāstra] of one existentness (eka-vastutva) [i.e., of there being really only one existent, viz., the Supreme Entity, upon whom everything that is manifest is dependent for its existence] is understood through that and others [i.e., through that statement in the Śruti-śāstra and statements in other śāstras, e.g., Śrīmad Bhāgavatam].
“[The jīva’s] Being a potency (śakti) [of the Supreme Entity] is [understood] because of [the jīva’s] being an instrument for its [i.e., the Supreme Entity’s] līlā by virtue of [the jīva’s] being of that nature [i.e., by virtue of the jīva’s being outdwelling to the Supreme Entity while also being ontologically one with it as a dependent part of it]. [The jīva’s] Minuteness [i.e., infinitesimality], further, is [understood] because of śabda [i.e., by means of statements heard in śāstra] on account of its pervasion of the entire body [that it is enveloped in] solely by means of its quality of influence just like a drop of yellow sandal [i.e., just as a drop of yellow sandalwood paste applied to the forehead can create a feeling of coolness throughout the entire body solely by means of its quality of being cooling and without actually being present throughout the entire body, so the jīva, which is infinitesimal in measure and not actually present throughout the entire body, can pervade the entire body by means of its quality of being able to influence the entire body]. All of this, furthermore, is not contradictory because of the Supreme’s being constituted of inconceivable potency (acintya-śakti). Such was affirmed previously [e.g., in KS 106] by the principle [stated in VS 2.1.27], ‘It is because of Śruti [i.e., because of the statements in the śāstra, that Brahman is understood to not be subject to modification or limitation] on account of śabda’s [i.e., śabda-pramāṇa’s] being the source [of valid knowledge of Brahman],’ and by [the statement in VP 1.22.56], ‘As the light of a fire situated in one place is pervasive [of the area around it], so the potency (śakti) of the Supreme Brahman is this entire universe [i.e., so the śakti of Parabrahman is manifest all-pervasively in the form of this material universe].’”
