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dvy-arthaiḥ padaiḥ piśunayec ca rahasya-vastu

dvy-arthaiḥ padaiḥ piśunayec ca rahasya-vastu |
(Unknown source; cited from a kāma-śāstra in Kāvya-prakāśa, Sāhitya-darpaṇa, and the Vaiṣṇavānandinī-ṭīkā to Śrīmad Bhāgavatam: 10.33.26)

“One should indicate a confidential matter with words that have a double meaning.”

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labdhātmikā satī rūḍhir bhaved yogāpahāriṇī

labdhātmikā satī rūḍhir bhaved yogāpahāriṇī |
kalpanīyā tu labhate nātmānaṁ yoga-bādhataḥ ||
(Kumārila Bhaṭṭa; cited in Jīva Gosvāmī’s ṭīkā to Brahma-saṁhitā: 5.1)

“The acquired conventional meaning (rūḍhi-artha) [of a word] overrides its etymological meaning (yoga-artha). A word meaning should not be supposed [through etymology] when there is an obstruction to its own etymological meaning [by the conventional meaning in the context of the word’s usage].”

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vyāvṛttir vyavahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam

vyāvṛttir vyavahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam |
(Tarka-dīpikā; Amṛta-ṭīkā on Hari-nāmāṛta-vyākaraṇa: 45)

“The purpose of a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) is differentiation [of the object possessing the characteristic from other objects] and [determining the practical] usage [of the object].”

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lakṣyate jñāyate’neneti lakṣaṇam

lakṣyate jñāyate’neneti lakṣaṇam |
(Amṛta-ṭīkā on Hari-nāmāṛta-vyākaraṇa: 45)

“That by which something is defined [alt., characterized, recognized, indicated] and known is a lakṣaṇa.”

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lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyāṁ vastu-siddhiḥ

lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyāṁ vastu-siddhiḥ, na tu kevala-pratijñā-mātreṇa |
(Unknown Source)

“Determination of an object arises from characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), not merely by an assertion.”

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virodho vākyayor yatra nāprāmāṇyaṁ tad iṣyate

virodho vākyayor yatra nāprāmāṇyaṁ tad iṣyate |
yathāviruddhatā ca syāt tathārthaḥ kalpyate tayoḥ ||
(Kūrma Puraṇa: 1.5.327; cited in Laghu Bhāgavatāmṛta: 1.5.327)

“When there is a contradiction between statements [in śāstra], that is not [to be] considered [an instance of] inauthenticity [i.e., one statement should not be considered inauthentic and only the other one authentic]. A meaning of both [statements, rather,] whereby no contradiction arises should be formulated.”

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taṁ tvām ahaṁ deva-varaṁ vareṇyaṁ

taṁ tvām ahaṁ deva-varaṁ vareṇyaṁ
prapadya īśaṁ pratibodhanāya |
chindhy artha-dīpair bhagavan vacobhir
granthīn hṛdayyān vivṛṇu svam okaḥ ||
(Śrīmad Bhāgavatam: 8.24.53)

[Satyavrata Rāja to Matsya Avatāra:] “I take shelter in him—you—the Best of the devas, the Supreme Īśa, for the purpose of awakening [by means of your teaching from my sleep on the bed of saṁsāra]. O Bhagavān, please cut the knots in my heart with your words that are illuminating of the [supreme] object (artha). Please reveal your own abode [i.e., please teach me the path that leads to attainment of it].”

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yeṣāṁ tu mate muktāv ānandānubhavo nāsti teṣāṁ pum-arthatā na sampadyate

yeṣāṁ tu mate muktāv ānandānubhavo nāsti, teṣāṁ pum-arthatā na sampadyate | sato’pi vastunaḥ sphuraṇābhāve nirarthakatvāt | na ca sukham ahaṁ syām iti kasyacid icchā, kintu sukham ahan anubhavāmi ity eva | tataś ca pravṛtty-abhāvāt tādṛśa-puruṣārtha-sādhana-preraṇāpi śāstre vyarthaiva syāt | tan-mate kevalānanda-rūpasyājñāna-duḥkha-sambandhāsambhavāt tan-nivṛtti-rūpaś ca puruṣārtho na ghaṭate | vigītaṁ tv īdṛśa-puruṣārthatvaṁ prācīnabarhiṣaṁ prati śrī-nārada-vākye ‘duḥkha-hāniḥ sukhāvāptiḥ śreyas tan neha ceṣyate’ iti | tasmād asty evānubhavaḥ | tathā ca śrutiḥ—‘rasaṁ hy evāyaṁ labdhvānandī bhavati’ iti | ‘ātma-ratiḥ ātma-krīḍaḥ’ ity ādiś ca |
(Prīti Sandarbha: 5)

“The quality of being the puruṣārtha cannot be established in the mukti of those [i.e., the proponents of Kevalādvaitavāda] in whose view there is no experience of bliss [in mukti] because of the uselessness even of an existent object in the absence of manifestation [of it, i.e., since something is effectively non-existent when it is existent yet unmanifest and thus unable to be experienced, a form of mukti wherein one is said to have the nature of being happiness yet no have any actual experience of that happiness cannot qualify as the puruṣārtha since the puruṣārtha is not just happiness but rather the experience of happiness]. Furthermore, no one’s desire is, ‘Let me become happiness.’ Rather, it is only, ‘I shall experience happiness.’ Therefore, furthermore, because of the absence of an impetus (pravṛtti) [i.e., because no one would have any motivation to pursue a supposed puruṣārtha wherein there is no experience of bliss since the pursuit of bliss is the fundamental impetus of every living being], even the directives in the śāstra for [taking up] a means (sādhana) to [attaining] such a puruṣārtha [i.e., such a supposed puruṣārtha devoid of the experience of bliss] would just go in vain. Because of the impossibility in their [i.e., the Kevalādvaitavādīs’] view of one whose form is bliss alone having a relation with ignorance and suffering, a puruṣārtha in the form of the cessation of these [i.e., of ignorance and suffering] also does not occur [according to them]. Such being the puruṣārtha [i.e., this idea of the Kevalādvaitavādīs that the puruṣārtha is neither the attainment of bliss nor the cessation of suffering], however, is contradicted in a statement of Śrī Nārada to Prācīnabarhi [in SB 4.25.4], ‘The highest good (śreyas) is the elimination of suffering and attainment of happiness, and that is not attainable here [i.e., by means of karma performed with a mind attached to worldly ends].’ Therefore, there is certainly experience [of bliss in mokṣa, that is, in the puruṣārtha]. Furthermore, there is also the Śruti [i.e., statements in the śāstra such as Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.7.1], ‘Only upon attaining this rasa [i.e., the Supreme Entity] does one become blissful,’ and [Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.25.2], ‘One [then] has delight in the self and play in the self.’”

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tad evaṁ tasya raśmi-paramāṇu-sthānīyāṁśatve siddhe tadvat sarvasyām api daśāyāṁ kartṛtva-bhoktṛtvādi-svarūpa-dharmā api sidhyanti

tad evaṁ tasya raśmi-paramāṇu-sthānīyāṁśatve siddhe tadvat sarvasyām api daśāyāṁ kartṛtva-bhoktṛtvādi-svarūpa-dharmā api sidhyanti | tadvad eva ca parameśvara-śakty-anugraheṇaiva te kārya-kṣamā bhavanti | tatra teṣāṁ prakṛti-vikāra-maya-kartṛtvādikaṁ tadīya-māyā-śakti-mayānugraheṇa | ata eva tat-sambandhāt teṣāṁ saṁsāraḥ | svānubhava-brahmānubhava-bhagavad-anubhava-kartṛtvādikaṁ tu tadīya-svarūpa-śakty-anugraheṇa | ‘yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kaṁ paśyet’ iti śrutiś ca tat-svarūpa-śaktiṁ vinā tad-darśanāsāmārthyaṁ dyotayati ‘yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ’ ity ādi śruteḥ | ata eva svarūpa-śakti-sambandhān māyāntardhāne teṣāṁ saṁsāra-nāśaḥ |
(Prīti Sandarbha: 5)

“Thus, in this way, with the establishment of [the jīva’s] being a part (aṁśa) of it [i.e., of the Supreme Entity] comparable to a particle in a ray [of the sun], the inherent characteristics (svarūpa-dharmas) of doership (kartṛtva), perceivership (bhokṛtva), and so forth [i.e., and knowership (jñātṛtva)] too are similarly established [to exist in the jīva] even in all states [i.e., even in the states of being conditioned (baddha), being liberated while living (jīvan-mukta), and liberated completely (mukta)]. Similarly also, these are capable of functioning [to the very limited extent that the jīva’s minute nature allows] only by the favor of Parameśvara’s śakti. In that regard, their [i.e., jīvas’] doership (kartṛtva) and so forth [i.e., perceivership (bhoktṛtva), and knowership (jñātṛtva)] based on transformations prakṛti exist by the favor of his [i.e., Parameśvara’s] māyā potency. Thus, their saṁsāra [i.e., condition of transmigrating throughout material existence] occurs because of [their] relation with that [i.e., māyā], whereas [their] doership (kartṛtva) and so forth in the form of experience of self (svānubhava), experience of Brahman (Brahmānubhava), and experience of Bhagavān (Bhagavad-anubhava) exist by the favor of his [i.e., Parameśvara’s] inherent potency (svarūpa-śakti). Also, the Śruti [i.e., the statement in BAU 2.4.14], ‘When everything has become [i.e., is perceived to be] only the Self (Ātmā) for him [i.e., for a realized person], then who shall see what by what means?’ illuminates the inability of seeing him [i.e., Parameśvara] without [the favor of] his inherent potency (svarūpa-śakti) because of the Śruti [i.e., the statement in Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.2.23], ‘He is attainable only by one whom he chooses.‘ Therefore, the termination of their [i.e., jīvas’] saṁsāra occurs upon the withdrawal of māyā because of a relation with the inherent potency (svarūpa-śakti) [of Parameśvara].”

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