kartā śāstrārthavattvāt
kartā śāstrārthavattvāt |
(Vedānta-sūtra: 2.3.31)
“[The jīva is] A doer because of śāstra being possessed of meaning.”
kartā śāstrārthavattvāt Read on →
Brahma-sūtra
nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ
nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ |
(Vedānta-sūtra: 2.3.16)
“The ātmā [i.e., the jīva] is not [created like other things in the world] because of [statements in] the Śruti [e.g., KU 1.2.18], because of [its] being eternal and so forth [i.e., its being conscious (by nature)], and because of those [i.e., other statements in the Smṛti].”
nātmā śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ Read on →
yatraikāgrato tatrāviśeṣāt
yatraikāgrato tatrāviśeṣāt |
(Vedānta-sūtra: 4.1.11)
“[Where should one perform upāsana?] Where one-pointedness [of mind] occurs, because of [there being] no particulars in that regard [i.e., because śāstra gives no injunctions regarding where upāsana should be performed other than where the mind can become one-pointed].”
yatraikāgrato tatrāviśeṣāt Read on →
sṛṣṭy-ādikaṁ harir naiva
sṛṣṭy-ādikaṁ harir naiva prayojanam apekṣya tu |
kurute kevalānandād yathā mattasya nartanam ||
pūrṇānandasya tasyeha prayojana-matiḥ kutaḥ |
muktā apy āpta-kāmāḥ syuḥ kim utāsyākhilātmanaḥ ||
(Nārāyaṇa-saṁhitā; cited in Bhagavat Sandarbha: 47; Paramātma Sandarbha: 93; Govinda-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra: 2.1.33)
“Hari does not require any motive for emanation and so forth [of the material universes]. He acts purely out of bliss, like the dancing of an intoxicated person. Since he is full of bliss, how can he have any thought of a motive? Even liberated beings are of satisfied desire, so how much more so must be the Ātmā of all?”
sṛṣṭy-ādikaṁ harir naiva Read on →
na hi śabda-jñānino brahma-vittvaṁ
na hi śabda-jñānino brahma-vittvaṁ, kintu tad-anubhāvina eva | na ca madhu madhuram iti śābdī-pratītim upetas tan-mādhurya-vid bhavati | … tathā ca śābda-jñānād anyaivopāsanā | bhakty-anubhava-pada-vācyā vidyā puruṣārtha-hetuḥ | … śābda-jñānaṁ tu vairāgyam iva tat-parikara-bhūtam |
(Govinda-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra 3.4.12)
“It is not that knowers of the words [i.e., the words of śāstra] are [actual] knowers of Brahman, but rather that only those who have experience of it [i.e., of Brahman] are. It is not that one who possess semantic knowledge based on the statement, ‘Honey is sweet’ becomes a knower of its sweetness [i.e., as only coming to know through language that a substance known as honey is sweet is different from actually experiencing its sweetness, so mere theoretical knowledge of Brahman is distinct from actual experience of Brahman]. … Furthermore, upāsanā [i.e., the process to realize Brahman] is certainly distinct from [mere] knowledge derived from words. Knowledge (vidyā) the referent of which is experience (anubhava) [of Brahman] brought about by bhakti, is the cause of [attaining] the goal of human life (puruṣātha). … Knowledge derived from words, like vairāgya, is an assisting element [of Brahma-vidyā, i.e., it is not Brahma-vidyā itself].”
na hi śabda-jñānino brahma-vittvaṁ Read on →
āvṛttir asakṛd upadeśāt liṅgāc ca
āvṛttir asakṛd upadeśāt | liṅgāc ca |
(Vedānta-sūtra: 4.1.1–2)
“Repetition [of sādhana practices] should be done repeatedly because of instructions [to do so in the śāstra]. And because of indicators [i.e., because it is observed to be done repeatedly by mahājanas].”
āvṛttir asakṛd upadeśāt liṅgāc ca Read on →